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This thesis explores the overall impact of New York City’s Empowerment Zone initiative 
and concludes whether or not the policy promoted a significant rise in local employment. 
Moreover, it expands on data collected from the beginning of the program in 1993 to the present 
day alongside first-person interviews and obtains a conclusion which reflects on the planning 
implications set forth by the existing Federal Opportunity Zone program enacted under the 2017 
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. ​By reflecting on the history and motivations that served as a foundation 
for these  programs existence, quantifying the complete extent at which it affected low-income 
residents of Central Harlem and the South Bronx, and placing its impact on contemporary policy, 
this thesis posits a balanced conclusion addressing the exact planning implications Special 
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Why is it important to examine special economic zones and their 
impact on low-income communities? 
 
The United States has the fourth highest total poverty rate of all OECD countries, (36 
total member nations.)  While America remains a global superpower with the world’s most 1
dynamic economy in 2017, approximately 45.6 million (14.6%) of its people were stuck below 
the poverty line. That same year the Central Harlem and Mott Haven/South Bronx 
neighborhoods in New York City experienced a significantly higher total poverty rate at 23.5%  2
and 44.2%  respectively, compared to 17.9% citywide. New York City’s 2017 economic 3
performance placed it just roughly $90 billion under the entire country of Canada ($1.5 trillion 
compared to $1.59 trillion), cementing it as a global economic giant. However, the majority of its 
wealth remains concentrated and while the city overall continues to prosper, many residents are 
increasingly left behind amidst a predominantly flourishing economic landscape. In order to 
combat hyper-localized poverty rates, in 1993 local policymakers reflecting on recent events that 
occurred during the 1992 LA riots sought to promote a new place-based strategy (Empowerment 
Zones) which encouraged private market intervention into low-income communities. This 
program sought to improve local employment opportunities through direct subsidy of private 
industries. This strategy was based on the enterprise zone formula outlined by British geographer 
Peter Hall who proposed “the absence of government constraints on capital, immigration, and 
labor in a handful of zones thrown open to all kinds of initiative, with minimal control."  4
1OECD (2019), Poverty rate (indicator). doi: 10.1787/0fe1315d-en (Accessed on 08 December 2019) 
2“Central Harlem Neighborhood Profile.” ​NYU Furman Center​, NYU Furman Center, 10 Dec. 2019. 
3“Mott Haven/South Bronx Neighborhood Profile.” ​NYU Furman Center​, NYU Furman Center, 10 Dec. 2019. 
4Zuckerman, Mortimer, et al. “Where's the Power in the Empowerment Zone?” ​City Journal​, The Manhattan Institute For Policy. 
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Accordingly, this thesis explores the history, implementation and outcomes of the 
federally mandated Empowerment Zone initiative implemented by the Clinton Administration in 
the early 1990s set in contrast to the assumptions described by Peter Hall, to understand if this 
experiment in place-based community development had a significant impact on increasing 
overall local job creation.  
 
The Clinton Empowerment Zone Program was signed into law under the Federal 
Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities Act of 1993. ​As the U.S. economy was 
beginning to emerge from a downturn, President Bill Clinton with the approval of Congress, 
placed the reinvigoration of inner cities at the heart of his strategy to stimulate growth in the 
economy. New York City was allocated two separate Empowerment Zones located respectively 
in the South Bronx and Central Harlem, and each was allocated significant economic 
inducements coupled with strict guidelines for private investment. While the main congressional 
sponsor of the 1993 federal legislation was the influential New York Congressman Charles B. 
Rangel, his efforts were preceded by several bipartisan attempts to implement Enterprise Zones 
throughout other low-income geographies during the presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George 
H.W. Bush. Republican Congressman Jack Kemp, from New York’s rural 31st District and 
Democratic Congressman Robert Garcia, represented the entire borough of the Bronx from 
1978-1990. In 1980, these two legislators authored the federal Kemp-Garcia Enterprise law 
which failed to be passed in the U.S. Congress. However, as Jack Kemp entered the executive 
cabinet of President George H.W. Bush in 1989, he continued to lobby for federally mandated 
Enterprise Zones, a goal that was not solidified until the policy was adopted in a bipartisan vote 
influenced by traumatic events of the 1992 LA Riots and signed into law by President Bill 
Clinton in 1993.  
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This thesis identifies the overall impact of New York City’s Empowerment Zone 
initiative culminating in a conclusion that reveals whether or not the policy produced a 
significant rise in local employment. Furthermore, it will expand on data collected from the 
beginning of the program in 1993 to the present day alongside first-person interviews and 
conclude on the planning implications of the existing Federal Opportunity Zone program enacted 
under the 2017 ​Tax Cuts and Jobs Act ​by the Trump administration​. ​By reflecting on the history 
and motivations that served as a foundational platform for the program’s existence, quantifying 
the complete extent at which it affected low-income residents of Central Harlem and the South 
Bronx, and placing its impact on contemporary policy, this thesis will impart a balanced 
conclusion addressing the exact planning implications special economic zones place on 
impoverished neighborhoods.  
 
 
Going forward, it is the intention of this thesis to accurately depict the direct impacts 
these place-based federal initiatives may have on isolated low-income communities and 
establishes a conclusion which suggests alternative actions to uplift the urban poor. Top-down, 
dislocated initiatives do not accurately deploy a precautionary principle which suggests the total 
range of impacts they may produce on marginal communities. Therefore, applying deliberate 
precision, this thesis will highlight the range of debilitating influences that these policies have 
produced within New York City as a clarion call to prevent further mishandling of future policies 






The 1980s brought with it a new vision of governance throughout the western world. 
Beginning with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and eventually crossing the pond to 
President Ronald Reagan, politicians departed from Keynesiest intervention policies of the past 
and turned towards a greater number of ‘market-oriented solutions’ in order to catalyze urban 
development. The basic notion of special economic urban zones relies on theories promulgated 
by neoclassical supply side economics, which posit that decreased government regulation and 
increased tax incentives will boost investor confidence, increase the pace of development and 
reinvigorate ‘blighted’ communities. It is important to recognize that this approach is 
non-partisan and has remained popular since the Reagan administration. While these programs 
have different names Enterprise Zones, Empowerment Zones, Promise Zones and Opportunity 
Zones, they share a common foundation. Leverage private equity in a way that boosts investment 
in underserved and low-income communities in both rural and urban neighborhoods across the 
nation. The major incentive that attracts private investors to these underserved communities are 
the generous tax breaks that they are provided. While the main political message behind the 
introduction of these programs is to increase overall municipal tax revenue and expand job 
opportunities for low-income residents, the programs have been criticized for their high barriers 
of entry and lack of due diligence in reporting on the performance of these various 
developments. For example, the most recent iteration of the program under President Donald 
Trump (Opportunity Zones) does not impose any “​requirements that people participating in the 
potentially lucrative economic development program detail what they are doing, where they are 
doing it and why they are doing it.”  5




In 2001, Bill Clinton designated his Clinton Foundation Headquarters in Harlem which 
was met with widespread fanfare from the local community and politicians alike. At the ribbon 
cutting ceremony captured by CSPAN President Clinton shared the following message: 
 
“People ask me now well Bill what did you do for Harlem when you were               
President? And I say when I came here to Harlem in 1992 I said that if you vote for                   
me I’ll turn this economy around, and I’ll create Empowerment Zones for poor             
communities that have been left behind and we turned the economy around created             
Empowerment Zones and invested $600 million of private investment years later in            
the Harlem Empowerment Zone, unemployment cut in half welfare cut in half,            
record amounts of investment in new police on the streets, new housing, new             
transportation I think I kept my word to Harlem and the best is yet to be.”  6
 
 
Therefore, this thesis will produce an analysis of the two Empowerment Zones located in 
New York City (Upper Manhattan - Central Harlem EZ and South Bronx EZ) in order to 
determine in an objective manner the extent at which these special economic zones have affected 
the lives of low-income New Yorkers. By examining local job creation the objective of this 
thesis is to track and map this trend since its inception in 1993 to the year 2016, and conclude if 
the current reality reflects the goals stated in the original mission of the federal Empowerment 
Zone initiative. While the majority of the research for this thesis will focus on the urban 
development agenda of President Bill Clinton, this thesis will also reflect on the impact of the 
Empowerment Zone program and outline the variety of planning implications which remain 
present in today’s Opportunity Zone program spearheaded by the Trump administration. 
 
 
6Local Politicians, Celebrities, and Supporters Welcomed Former President Clinton as He Opened His Office in the Manhattan 
Neighborhood of Harlem.​, CSPAN, 30 July 2001, www.c-span.org/video/?165419-1/president-clintons-office-opening. 
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2 - History and Location of New York City’s Empowerment Zones 
The New York Empowerment Zone (NYEZ) includes the Upper Manhattan 
Empowerment Zone Development Corporation (UMEZDC) and the Bronx Overall Economic 
Development Corporation (BOEDC). It was established in the early 1990s as a place-based 
revitalization strategy relying on public-private partnerships to promote sustained private 
investments within the NYEZ alongside “a public investment pool of $300 million equally 
contributed from the city, state and federal governments.”  While the initiative brought with it 7
unprecedented investment from a tripartite-entity (municipal, state and federal governments) the 
NYEZ functions as a corporate entity. This corporate structure meant that both the UMEZDC 
and BOEDC were responsible for producing balanced budgets and also functioned as 
self-financing revenue generators. This unique paradox where both entities (UMEZDC and 
BOEDC) are nonprofit organizations but at the same time must produce balanced and 
pro-growth budgets has led many critics to point out the contrarian nature of these community 
development initiatives. However, this unique and unprecedented corporate structuring of both 
organizations has allowed them to continue as profitable entities that “expand the range and 
scope of economic activity, enhance capital opportunity for local businesses and institutions and 
improve the quality of life for residents, workers and visitors. Businesses of all sizes in the 
Empowerment Zone can benefit from the available resources.”  Going forward, this thesis will 8
identify if generous tax incentives, direct subsidies and public investment into these economic 
development initiatives did in fact lead to a significant increase in local employment at small 
business establishments within the boundaries of the NYEZ.  
7City of New York, et al. ​New York Empowerment Zone​. New York Empowerment Zone, 1995. 




Figure 1: Boundaries of the New York Empowerment Zone (NYEZ) established in 1993 comprised of 44 individual census tracts 
 
Source: New York Empowerment Zone Corporation 
 
The boundaries of the NYEZ include 44 individual census tracts based on the 1990 
decennial census. There are 9 census tracts located in the South Bronx and 35 located in Harlem, 
Washington Heights and Inwood neighborhoods of Manhattan. 
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At the time the NYEZ was officially established in 1993 unemployment in the Bronx 
peaked at approximately 14.2% in January 1993 . The 9 census tracts within the BOECD that 9
enjoyed several of the aforementioned public and private incentives experienced a sharp decline 
in unemployment from 2006-2017 falling from 9%-6.5%  over this period.  As of 2018, 10
unemployment in the Bronx has dropped from 14.2% to approximately 5.7% producing the most 
drastic decline in local unemployment compared to all other boroughs of New York City. 
According to Marlene Cintron the President of the BOEDC “more than 120,000 Bronx residents 
are employed as of 2017 than in 2010.”  This drastic drop in unemployment is nothing short of 11
an economic miracle for an area that was infamously described in the 1977 Major League 
Baseball World Series as “Ladies and Gentleman, the Bronx is Burning.” In 1992 unemployment 
in Manhattan peaked at 9.4% , a higher rate than even at the peak of the 2008 financial crisis. 12
The 9 census tracts within the UMEZDC similar to their counterparts within the BOEDC 
experienced a fall of 11%-7.8% in local unemployment from 2006-2017 , compared to the 3.7% 13
of unemployed within Manhattan overall in 2018 . At first glance, it would seem that the rate of 14
local employment was outpaced by a greater decline in overall unemployment within the greater 
boundaries of the Bronx and Manhattan. However, both SEZs in the Bronx and Manhattan 
produced a steeper drop in unemployment from their inception in 1993 compared to their greater 
boroughs over the same period of time.  
9Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
10NYC Population FactFinder, South Bronx Economic Profile.  
11Cintron, Marlene. “Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation.” ​Marlene Cintron​. 
12NY State Department of Labor. “Department of Labor.” ​Local Area Unemployment Statistics Program - New York State 
Department of Labor​. 
13NYC Population FactFinder, Upper Manhattan Economic Profile. 
14NY State Department of Labor. “Department of Labor.” ​Local Area Unemployment Statistics Program - New York State 
Department of Labor​. 
12 
 
While it is clear that the creation of the NYEZ has produced sharp declines in overall 
unemployment, it is unclear whether these jobs are being produced locally by small business 
establishments or if the majority of new jobs are going towards non-local resident employees. 
Understanding the basic truth that employment has significantly fallen within the boundaries of 
the NYEZ this thesis will produce a methodology which clearly defines local employment and 
produces an analysis that concludes whether or not local employment significantly increased 


















2 - Literature Review 
Purpose for Evaluating Impacts of Local SEZs 
SEZs Have Always Been a Contentious Issue How Have Recent Studies Evaluated its Impacts? 
 
After completing preliminary research on the connection between special economic zones 
and their impact on local neighborhood employment in New York City, a variety of sources 
revealed themselves to be heavily invested in research and commentary on this issue. The 
majority of literature on this issue suggests that the implementation of Empowerment Zones 
within underserved communities experiencing high rates of unemployment, would not 
significantly increase local and gainful employment. Researchers formed this conclusion by 
developing several complex econometric models that addressed the following guiding questions: 
 
 Do business incentives actually cause states or localities to grow more rapidly than they would have otherwise?  
If so, is the growth targeted so as to provide net gains to poorer communities or poorer people, or is it merely a zero-sum game?  
How costly to government is the provision of these incentives compared to alternative policies?  15
 
Therefore, this literature review will draw on key sources and examine their varying 
methodologies in order to provide further insight into how previous academic professionals have 
sought to measure the impacts of SEZs throughout the United States of America. Accordingly, 
the precedent formed by these investigations will inform the research of this thesis going forward 
in order to compare the rate of growth of SEZs here in New York City compared to the examples 
included within past research outlined in this chapter.  
 
15Alan Peters & Peter Fisher (2004) The Failures of Economic Development Incentives, Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 70:1, 27-37, DOI: ​10.1080/01944360408976336 
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Purpose of Comparative Research Analysis 
 
In their 2007 JAPA (Journal of the American Planning Association) article titled ​The 
Failures of Economic Development Incentives, ​co-authors Alan Peters and Peter Fisher 
developed a complex econometric model which evaluates the outcomes of local employment 
within the Enterprise Zones of New Jersey and several other SEZs located in California, Texas, 
Florida and New York. They concluded on the topic of local and gainful employment that:  
“workers in most enterprise zones had longer commutes—even when standardized by mode and income—than workers 
who do not work in zones. The vast majority of workers in enterprise zones did not live in an enterprise zone; 
moreover, the vast majority of those who lived in these zones did not work in them. Thus the local employment gains 
derived from bringing jobs to poor neighborhoods are greatly diluted— a majority of the jobs will go to non-zone 
residents.” 
 
Furthermore, apart from their own research methods (which took place in 2002), they also 
reviewed the general outcomes of an additional nine other econometrically guided studies dating 
back to 1961 with the majority concluding that SEZs produced “ambiguous to no discernable 
impacts” on the local employment outcomes of these place-based initiatives. The authors conclude 
in context to the three aforementioned guiding questions above that “after decades of policy 
experimentation and literally hundreds of scholarly studies, none of these claims (SEZs improve 
local employment) is clearly substantiated. Indeed, as we have argued in this article, there is a good 
chance that all of these claims are false.”  Although both of these authors agree that SEZs of the 16
past produced ambiguous results, their publication did not take into account the nationwide 
Empowerment Zone Program implemented under the Clinton administration. Therefore, it is the 
goal of this thesis to produce a sophisticated time series which tracks the outcomes of local 
employment within the two EZ geographies of New York City over a two-decade period. 
16Alan Peters & Peter Fisher (2004) The Failures of Economic Development Incentives, Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 70:1, 27-37, DOI: ​10.1080/01944360408976336 
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Past Examples of SEZ Reports and Articles 
 
Apart from the foundational piece of literature outlined above the nine other research 
reports all implement a similar form of economic data analysis in order to deduce the various 
impacts SEZs have on local neighborhood employment. All of these reports track the progress of 
several place-based SEZ initiatives in order to produce a detailed and measured conclusion on 
whether they produced ambiguous or clear results. Beginning with Economist John F. Due who 
in 1961 published a report in the National Tax Journal titled, ​Studies of State-Local Tax 
Influences on Location of Industry ​which concluded that the effect of SEZs on increasing local 
employment was “minor at best.”   Fellow economist William Oakland produced identical 17
results in his 1974 article, ​Local taxes and intra-urban industrial location: A survey.  The first 18
major study to outline Enterprise Zones specifically, was the 1996 Wilder and Rubin article 
published in the Journal of the American Planning Association titled, ​Rhetoric versus reality: A 
review of studies on state enterprise zone programs ​and produced a conclusion that described the 
programs as producing “a variable impact on employment growth.”  While a recurring theme of 19
a majority of existing literature is the use of econometric analyses, this thesis narrows the 
research lens by focusing on a particular urban geography (Upper Manhattan EZ and South 
Bronx EZ) and instead of econometric modelling, will produce a sophisticated time series and 
regression analysis of both local employment and small business growth to assess the various 
impacts that the Empowerment Zone program has had on the local neighborhood employment. 
 
17DUE, J. (1961). STUDIES OF STATE-LOCAL TAX INFLUENCES ON LOCATION OF INDUSTRY. ​National Tax Journal, 
14​(2), 163-173. Retrieved February 15, 2020, from ​www.jstor.org/stable/41790839 
18Oakland, W. H. (1978). Local taxes and intra-urban industrial location: A survey. In G. F. Break (Ed.), Metropolitan financing 
and growth management policies (pp. 13-30). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
19Wilder, M., & Rubin, B. (1996). Rhetoric versus reality: A review of studies on state enterprise zone programs. Journal of the 
American Planning Association, 473 – 491. 
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3 - Case Studies: Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone 
The Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone Development Corporation (UMEZDC) was 
founded in 1994 and officially designated after the passing of H.R. 1414 - Empowerment Zone 
and Job Creation Act.  A federal piece of legislation introduced and passed with the sponsorship 20
of New York Congressman Charles B. Rangel. According to officials at the UMEZ, “the borders 
of the empowerment zone were created to assist residents that had the highest concentration of 
poverty as indicated by the 1990 federal Census.”  It was the vision of local officials and 21
President Clinton at the time to facilitate local economic development and employment of 
impoverished individuals through a one time federal grant which would then initiate a greater 
influx of local private investment within these communities. As of 2017, local UMEZ officials 
calculated that the total amount of dollars attributed to public funds totalled $250 million for 
investment in Upper Manhattan’s impoverished communities. Investment in the local community 
from UMEZDC has continued on an annual basis. From 1994 to 2018, the UMEZDC invested 
approximately $242 million ($87 million in loans to mixed-use real estate developments, 
commercial businesses and small businesses, $57 million in tax-exempt bonds for real estate 
developments and $98 million focused on local arts and culture initiatives and workforce 
development) was provided in the form of direct investments to the local community.  Since 22
completing its first round of direct grants and loans in October 1996 the UMEZ claims that it has 
leveraged over $1.1 billion in private investments within the local community contributing to the 
development of over 10,000 new local jobs. 
20 H.R. 1414 ​Empowerment Zone Job Creation Act of 1995  
https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/1414?r=5&s=7 
21“​Sustaining the Economic Revitalization of All Communities in Upper Manhattan​.” Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone, 
Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone Development Corporation 
22H.R. 1414 ​Empowerment Zone Job Creation Act of 1995   
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The UMEZDC has a six-pronged diversified approach to local investment which 
includes: the issuance of commercial business loans to stimulate local small business growth and 
employment, distribution of commercial real estate development loans which act as junior 
subordinate loans which can be accompanied by other municipal loans in order to promote 
targeted development of local large-scale commercial real estate projects, a real estate fast track 
loan program (REFT) which provides local residents who own property the ability to redevelop 
their land, a Cultural Investment Fund (CIF) which provides significant funding towards local 
arts and cultural events, a Workforce Development Fund also exists and the UMEZDC also 
provides a significant annual allotment of microloans of up to $50,000 for local residents in order 
to encourage and facilitate local entrepreneurship.  
 
In terms of governance, the UMEZDC functions as a local autonomous Community 
Development Financial Institution (CDFI) and therefore acts independently in terms of the 
pursuit and approval of local community development and investment strategies. In the past, the 
UMEZDC has financed a variety of projects including the redevelopment of Harlem’s Victoria 
Theater. In 2015, they provided a $10 million junior loan helping to finance this redevelopment 
project and claim that it will produce “approximately 575 construction jobs and 373 full-time 
positions.”  In 2018 they issued a $5 million loan towards the redevelopment of the George 23
Washington Bridge Bus Terminal in an effort to modernize the local bus facility believing this 
project would produce increased job opportunities in terms of new and expanded retail as well as 
expanding the space for local small businesses.  
23“​Sustaining the Economic Revitalization of All Communities in Upper Manhattan​.” Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone, 
Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone Development Corporation 
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I interviewed the former General Counsel and Chief of Staff at the UMEZDC Lucille 
McEwen, and we discussed the various challenges as well as successes that the UMEZDC has 
faced since its inception. Under her tenure, congressional approval was granted to the local 
UMEZDC which allowed for the allocation of federal spending from the USHUD (United States 
Department of Housing and Urban Development) headed at the time by current New York State 
Governor Andrew Cuomo. However, according to Ms. McEwen this special relationship was 
temporary and “relied on formal federal congressional approval, state approval as well as 
municipal approval every 10 years.”  Ms. McEwen explained that before she departed the 24
UMEZ in 2002, she had lobbied local, state and federal officials to formally designate the 
corporation as a Community Development Financial Institution. This process successfully took 
place in 2017, and the UMEZDC is now monitored under the authority of the federal Department 
of the Treasury instead of HUD. The corporation now no longer requires tripartite approval from 
municipal, state and federal authorities and is self-governing as well as self-financed. According 
to Ms. McEwen, because it now operates as a CDFI the UMEZ “is able to distribute, repay and 
redistribute loans to local small businesses as well as grant funding to local nonprofits to 
stimulate workforce development, the loans allow for a viable future to continue allowing the 
UMEZDC to operate beyond  the EZ lifetime formerly restricted by HUD and continue as a 
comprehensive self-financing CDFI.”  This produced a significant step towards promoting 25
longevity and self-reliance which the UMEZDC continues to rely on today in order to support 
various aforementioned operations and business investments within the local community.  
 
24Lucille McEwen Interview 
25Lucille McEwen Interview 
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On the topic of long term challenges, the former Chief of Staff explained that ​“​in Harlem, 
in many ways we were a victim of our own success. Many of the long-term residents can no 
longer afford to live there. Even though more entry level jobs were created, restaurant rows for 
example for small businesses, and many other local business owners benefited, housing costs 
escalated exponentially, because they’ve increased around 50% since the inception of the 
Empowerment Zone.”  Although, this SEZ introduced several high level investments in local 26
small businesses like the Apollo Theater (200+ employees, the Victoria Theater Redevelopment 
Project (400+ employees), Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc. (400+ employees), Dance Theater of 
Harlem (100+ employees), George Washington Bridge Bus Terminal Redevelopment, Studio 
Museum of Harlem (100+ employees) and Harlem USA Shopping Complex (200+ employees).  27
However, Ms. McEwen explained that not enough attention was paid towards preserving 
affordability for local businesses as well as residents. Going forward, this thesis will explore the 
extent at which local employment within Harlem has changed over time in context to greater 
citywide trends to determine whether or not local employment within the South Bronx and Upper 
Manhattan Empowerment Zones is proportional to citywide trends over time, or if the rate of 





26Lucille McEwen Interview 
27“​Sustaining the Economic Revitalization of All Communities in Upper Manhattan​.” Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone, 
Upper Manhattan Empowerment Zone Development Corporation 
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Case Studies: South Bronx Empowerment Zone 
In the case of the South Bronx, the Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation 
(BOEDC) was founded in 1987 and functions in a similar role to the UMEZDC as the 
administrator of the Bronx Empowerment Zone, and is responsible for the majority of economic 
development strategies throughout the borough. The BOEDC facilitates public-private 
partnerships, technical assistance to small businesses, finances loans for local real estate 
developments and spearheaded the founding of the Bronx Initiative for Energy and Environment 
(BIEE).  According to the BOEDC their mission “is to assist existing Bronx based businesses to 28
expand and to encourage additional businesses to start-up in or relocate to Bronx County. In 
fulfilling this mission BOEDC seeks to maximize employment opportunities for Bronx 
residents.” Through a variety of services which include site selection, procurement assistance, 
liaison services with government agencies, job development and capacity building the BOEDC 
successfully secured the Mott Haven neighborhood of the Bronx for the development of a 
400,000 square foot warehouse and packaging facility for grocery delivery service Fresh Direct. 
This allowed for the development of over 1000 new local jobs. This wave of investment 
stemming from the BOEDC was said to have been a major factor in dropping unemployment in 
the Bronx from 14.2% in 2010 to approximately 5% in 2020. According to the current President 
of the BOEDC, Marlene Cintron “more than 120,000 more Bronx residents are employed today 
than in 2010.”   29
 
 
28Cintron, Marlene. “Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation.” ​Marlene Cintron​. 
29Cintron, Marlene. “Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation.” ​Marlene Cintron​. 
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The OBEDC has a narrower focus compared to the UMDC. By focusing on  providing 
low-interest loans and personalized assistance in the form of acting as a liaison in forming 
successful public-private partnerships, the OBEDC seeks to address local community needs by 
encouraging private investment. According to their President, Marlene Cintron “every year, we 
welcome new companies to our borough with business-friendly incentives, low-interest loans 
and personalized assistance from our staff to meet employment needs.”  This is unlike the 30
UMEZDC which has more rigidity in terms of guiding definitions which place clearer barriers on 
the eligibility for loans or small business services. Since its inception this investment approach 
has guided the OBEDC to pursue projects that encourage green investments, brownfield real 
estate development strategies as part of the South Bronx Brownfield Opportunity Area (BOA) 
and resilient waterfront redevelopment programs such as the 4.95-acre Harlem River Promenade 
Project.  
 
In terms of governance, the BOEDC serves as the direct economic development arm of 
the Office of the Bronx Borough President, Ruben Diaz Jr. This designation serves as the largest 
distinction between the makeup of the BOEDC compared to the UMEZDC. While the UMEZDC 
remains an autonomous and self-financing CDFI, the BOEDC remains tied directly to the local 
government. As previously mentioned, this requires tripartite (city, state and federal) 
recertification of the BOEDC on a ten year continuous basis. While the threat of this 
recertification being revoked is relatively low in times of productive citywide economic activity, 
the everyday functions of this Empowerment Zone may be threatened if it is not approved by all 
necessary levels of government.  
30Cintron, Marlene. “Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation.” ​Marlene Cintron​. 
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Understanding that these case studies have garnered an abundance of anecdotal evidence 
recovered from primary sources, it is important to expand the understanding of these two 
Empowerment Zones into a geographic boundary that includes both the neighborhood and 
citywide perspective as well. In order to establish this lens, I gathered local unemployment data 
over an eleven year period 2006-2017 geographically isolated within the respective EZ, 
neighborhood and citywide boundaries (see figures 2 and 3 below). In terms of the largest 
decrease in unemployment, assumptions from primary sources seem to fit the raw data. The 
largest decrease in overall unemployment dropped within the boundaries of both Empowerment 
Zone designated geographies, dropping 1.5% from 2006-2017. While the city experienced just 
0.06% drop in unemployment from 2006-2017. The Empowerment Zone boundaries also 
experienced a greater drop in unemployment compared to the greater neighborhood area which 
was limited to a 1.4% decrease in unemployment over the same period of time. This initial 
investigation seems to produce a conclusion in favor of the establishment of SEZs in terms of 
encouraging local and efficient place-based community development practices. Where a 
bottom-up relationship is formed in the words of Lucille McEwen where local community needs 
are established and tripartite approval is garnered from all necessary levels of government in 
order to promote even and equitable development practices. However, utilizing general 
unemployment standards as a measurement does not establish where the location of employment 
is for local EZ residents. Therefore, the final methodology of this thesis establishes a more rigid 
standard for defining local employment and measures this standard over the same period of time 
(2006-2017) in order to narrow the lens and produce detailed findings which conclude whether 




Preliminary Findings - Local, Neighborhood and Municipal Employment Rates 
 
Empowerment Zone Boundaries - Rate of Unemployment 2006-2017 
 
Figure 2: Rate of Unemployment within Central Harlem and South Bronx EZs from 2006-2017 
 
Surrounding Neighborhood Boundaries - Rate of Unemployment 2006-2017 
 
Figure 3: Rate of Unemployment in Neighborhoods surrounding EZs (includes EZ boundaries as well) 
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Figure 4: Rate of Unemployment in New York City as a Whole (includes EZ boundaries as well) 
 
While the diagrams above suggest that employment within  New York City EZs has 
increased over time, it does not provide a conclusion as to if this employment is within local 
commuting distance or to other locations within the city. The goal of these federally mandated 
EZs was to promote long term economic development for local underserved communities with a 
particular emphasis on increasing local employment. While we have established that overall 
employment has increased relative to the greater neighborhood and city respectively, it can not 
be said at this time whether or not local employment of formally unemployed residents increased 
at a significant rate. Many critics of SEZs specify that one of their failures is the establishment of 
local employment opportunities and therefore the core of my methodology defines local 
employment measurements here in New York City and concludes whether or not it increased 
significantly within local EZ boundaries compared to the city as a whole.  
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4 - Methodology 
This thesis methodology employs a two-pronged quantitative approach towards 
examining local employment trends compared to the change in the number of local small 
business establishments over time. As previously mentioned, a major priority of this federal 
initiative was to implement autonomous development corporations which would serve as 
stewards of their local community utilizing federal funding in order to promote stable and even 
local economic development and job growth. By observing the proportional changes of local 
employment and small business creation over time, an accurate model can be developed which 
compares and contrasts the changes in local EZ employment and small business growth 
compared to the same standards citywide. Therefore, this thesis methodology is guided by the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Empowerment Zones implemented under the Clinton Presidency which sought to increase overall job creation and 
local employment in low-income urban neighborhoods, instead, produced a negligible increase in local job growth 
compared to non-EZ communities.  
 
By the formation of a clear and concise GIS analysis this guiding supposition is answered with 
the formation of a sophisticated time series from the early 2000s in order to observe whether or 
not there is a significant difference between local employment and small business growth within 
established Empowerment Zones compared to New York City as a whole. This hypothesis posits 
that Empowerment Zones do not create sufficient local job growth based on the findings outlined 
within the literature review. It is therefore a null hypothesis which recognizes that the 
impositions of SEZs does not promote a significant difference in local job growth. 
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GIS Methodology #1 - Spatial Analysis Defining Local Employment Measurements  
Figure 5: GIS Methodology which explains the unit of measurement (Travel time to work) from census figures 
spatially joined to the Empowerment Zone boundaries of Central Harlem and the South Bronx.  
 
The first step of this methodology compares and contrasts local employment numbers 
within the two different Empowerment Zones compared to their citywide counterparts from the 
years 2010-2016. Using ACS (American Community Survey) datasets acquired from American 
FactFinder and exported from excel to ArcMap the data was spatially joined to the boundaries of 
both the UMEZDC and BOEDC. Local area employment in this case is defined within the time 
of 24-29 minutes in terms of an individual’s round trip commute to his or her work. This unit 
was established based on 50% of the New York Citywide 2017 average commute of 57.92 
minutes.   31
31Zwirn, Ed. “New Yorkers Have One of the Worst Commutes, Survey Says.” ​New York Post​, New York Post, 13 Nov. 2017. 
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GIS Methodology #2 - Spatial Analysis Defining Local Small Business Measurements 
Figure 6: GIS Methodology which explains the unit of measurement (Small business growth) from census figures 
spatially joined to the Empowerment Zone boundaries of Central Harlem and the South Bronx.  
 
The second step of this methodology compares and contrasts small business growth 
within the two differing Empowerment Zones compared to the citywide average from the years 
2010-2016. Also, utilizing ACS (American Community Survey) datasets acquired from 
American FactFinder and exported from excel to ArcMap spatially joining the x,y data 
components to the boundaries of each respective Empowerment Zone. Small businesses in this 
case are defined as established firms with 500 employees or less. This definition is recognized as 
an industry standard and defined by the United States Small Business Administration as an 
industry standard.  
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This research method is unlike any former study outlined within the literature review. 
While other investigations into the net effect of SEZs employed sophisticated econometric 
research methods or detailed survey analysis, they did not perform their analysis in a 
retrospective manner. All previous studies used existing economic data at the time in order to 
forecast future trends. Therefore this GIS analysis plays a different role because it produces 
sophisticated time series analysis of past economic performance to examine current data as it 
pertains to local employment and small business within the strict boundaries of established SEZs. 
As former research states “Enterprise Zones offer a particularly interesting study of the effects of 
incentives on local growth. In theory, enterprise zones should be one of the best forms of 
economic development, since they involve targeting generous incentives at small places.”  32
However, with the use of econometric modeling and various other methods researchers 
concluded that “the econometric, survey, and case study research we reviewed found small or no 
effects in all but a few instances.”  While their analysis did not focus on a retrospective 33
approach to measuring local SEZ outcomes, this thesis performs just that. Therefore, this detailed 
time series and linear regression analysis will offer a wider lens towards examining both the 
significant challenges and successes that New York City’s Empowerment Zone neighborhoods 
have experienced over the past several decades. It also employs a mixed-method approach that 
establishes the viewpoints of decision making stakeholders on the ground and provides a detailed 
summation of the various impacts that their various programs have had on specific urban areas 
lying within federally mandated Empowerment Zones.  
32Alan Peters & Peter Fisher (2004) The Failures of Economic Development Incentives, Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 70:1, 27-37, DOI: ​10.1080/01944360408976336 
33Alan Peters & Peter Fisher (2004) The Failures of Economic Development Incentives, Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 70:1, 27-37, DOI: ​10.1080/01944360408976336 
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Examining the Results - Changes in Local Employment and Small Businesses Over Time 
Figure 7: Time series (2010-2016) comparing the change in small business growth compared to the change in local 
employment within New York City’s Empowerment Zones 
 
In terms of small business growth, New York’s Empowerment Zones experienced an 
increase of nearly one-thousand new local small businesses over just a seven-year period. This 
raw data reflects the testimony of both BOEDC President Marlene Cintron and former Chief of 
Staff to the UMEZDC both of whom outlined the success of their small business loan initiatives. 
However, this significant rise in small business growth did not raise overall local employment 
numbers. In fact, over the same seven-year period local employment plateaued and began to fall 
peaking in 2014 at approximately 2,000 individuals.  
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Figure 8: Time series (2010-2016) comparing the change in small business growth compared to the change in local 
employment within New York City overall 
While small businesses grew at a rate of approximately 14.2% within the city’s local 
Empowerment Zone boundaries, over this same seven-period, citywide small businesses grew by 
approximately 8.1%. However, the most significant difference is the drastic fall in local 
employment which occurred in 2016 citywide. Where local employment fell by approximately 
5.24% from 2010. While this may seem a drastic drop in local employment from the graphic 
illustration the same trend of local employment within New York’s Empowerment Zones 




Interpreting the Results - While Small Businesses Grew Local Employment Fell  
 
From census data it is clear that small business growth within local SEZ boundaries 
outpaced the city average in a significant manner however, the evidence also suggests that local 
employment did not significantly increase as a result of this place-based growth strategy. 
Testimony from Marlene Cintron, the former President of the BOEDC claims that she helped 
bring jobs and opportunities to “the Bronx by supporting and financing local businesses...using 
her expertise to make Fresh Direct see the Bronx the way she sees it: a diverse collection of 
hardworking, determined individuals. After Fresh Direct saw what a special place the Bronx is, 
they moved their operations and over 3000 jobs in order to expand their business. Over 1000 
Bronx residents now work there. Marlene also helped the Mall of Bay Plaza’s 69 stores hire 
locally. Over 70% of the 1600 jobs there belong to Bronx residents.”  While it is true as 34
previously mentioned, that the local unemployment rate within the SEZ boundaries fell at a 
faster pace than the surrounding area as well as the city overall, these place-based strategies did 
not significantly increase local employment of neighborhood workers. A similar trend was 
present in the UMEZDC boundaries in Manhattan, where small business loans expanded on a 
growing local restaurant industry and rebranded 110th to 125th streets on Frederick Douglass 
Boulevard as ‘restaurant row’ significantly improving the welfare of local small businesses but 
not significantly improving local neighborhood employment. In order to provide a more accurate 
analysis of whether the aforementioned null hypothesis of my research methods could be 
accepted or rejected I performed a regression analysis over the same seven-year period 
comparing the change in small business growth relative to local employment. 
34Cintron, Marlene. “Bronx Overall Economic Development Corporation.” ​Marlene Cintron​. 
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Change in EZ Small Business Growth Relative to Local Employment - Regression Analysis 
Figure 9: Time series (2010-2016) Regression analysis of changes in Local Empowerment Zone employment 
relative to local Small Business growth 
 
As the data suggests because the r-squared value between the two variables local EZ 
employment (independent variable) and change in EZ small businesses (dependent variable) is 
below 0.95, it would seem conclusive that there is not a significant relationship between the two 
variables. Furthermore, with a p-value of 0.317 we cannot reject the aforementioned null 
hypothesis, and can conclude based on the data that the establishment of local Empowerment 
Zones within New York City did not significantly increase local employment compared to the 
rest of the city boundaries overall.  
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5 - Planning Implications of SEZs Going Forward: Opportunity Zones 
The ​Tax Cuts and Jobs Act ​was officially signed into law by President Donald Trump on 
December 22, 2017 and ​included a new Opportunity Zone (OZ) community development strategy. 
Unlike the aforementioned Empowerment Zone initiative which brought with it complex 
guidelines incentivizing local employment programs for jobless residents, the OZ initiative does 
not abide by the same rigorous application criteria. According to the Executive Office of the 
President of the United States, “Under the TCJA, investors can get tax benefits by investing in 
communities designated as Opportunity Zones. Investors receive tax benefits on capital gains that 
they reinvest into Opportunity Zones through investment vehicles called Qualified Opportunity 
Funds. These benefits are structured to promote long-term investment that will help these 
communities recover and thrive.”  However, an in-depth investigative project coordinated by the 35
New York Times​ concluded that, “billions of untaxed investment profits are beginning to pour into 
high-end apartment buildings and hotels, storage facilities that employ only a handful of workers, 
and student housing in bustling college towns, among other projects.”  In October of 2019, 36
Democratic Senator from New Jersey Cory Booker, who co-sponsored the original OZ legislation 
called on the​ ​“​Treasury Inspector General for a “Complete Review” of the Department of the 
Treasury’s implementation of Opportunity Zones.”  This chapter will identify the similarities and 37
differences between the OZ and EZ programs examining historical data as well as primary 
interviews with professionals, and provide a conclusion on the various planning implications that 
the Opportunity Zone program presents compared to its Empowerment Zone counterpart.  
35Office of the White House. “The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Is Generating An Economic Resurgence in Communities Across the 
Country.” ​The White House​, The United States Government. 
36Drucker, Jesse, and Eric Lipton. “How a Trump Tax Break to Help Poor Communities Became a Windfall for the Rich.” ​The 
New York Times​, The New York Times, 31 Aug. 2019. 
37Senator Cory Booker. “Following Allegations of Misconduct, Booker, Cleaver, Kind Urge Treasury Inspector General for 





What is an Opportunity Zone and where are they located throughout New York City? 
While the Opportunity Zone program was enacted through federal law, it is administered at 
the state level with each state designating its individual portfolio of QOZs (qualified opportunity 
zones). According to the NYU Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, “​an Opportunity 
Zone is a low-income census tract with an individual poverty rate of at least 20 percent and median 
family income no greater than 80 percent of the Area Median Income (AMI). The program 
provides three types of tax incentives for investors: temporary deferral, step-up in basis, and 
permanent exclusion. All types reduce or defer the amount of taxes investors must pay for their 
capital gains.”  Unlike Empowerment Zones, which were administered by local non-profit 38
entities, Opportunity Zones encourage infusion of private capital through the formation of QOFs 
(Qualified Opportunity Funds). Opportunity Funds lever private equity through targeted 
investment within these low-income communities. Investors can include HNIs (High Net Worth 
Individuals), Private Equity Firms, Investment Banks (i.e. Goldman Sachs Urban Investment 
Group), and Hedge Funds that raise capital through tightly formed investment Schedules 
designated by the Federal Department of the Treasury which identify various locations for 
permissible investment.  In New York State there are 514 recommended Census Tracts, which 
represent a quarter of all federally qualified Opportunity Zones throughout the country. They 
“were selected based on recommendations from the Regional Economic Development Councils, 
local input, prior public investment and their ability to attract private investment.” In fact, the two 
aforementioned New York City Empowerment Zones are also designated as QOZs, with the city 
containing 307 of the entire state’s 514 Opportunity Zones. (see figure 10) 





Figure 10: New York City Opportunity Zones Located in 307 Census Tracts  
Source: Citizens Budget Commission (CBC) 
While New York City remains one of the major economic engines for the United States as 
well as the State of New York, approximately 14.2% of its 2,168 census tracts have been 
designated as Opportunity Zones. My interview with General Counsel and COO of the New York 
City Housing Development Corporation, Richard Froehlich, revealed that the OZ program adopted 
a quantity not quality approach ​“Opportunity Zones today have almost zero regulation and have a 
high upside which are favorable tax incentives for investors. They consist mainly of shovel ready 
projects without community needs brought into the equation; these projects therefore do not 
necessarily focus emphasis on local job creation or increased local employment.” With the 
majority of OZ projects already ​approved ‘shovel ready’ (approved for development) they did not 
require the same discretional approval of projects which took place within the boundaries of the 
BOEDC or UMEZDC. 
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Apart from lacking the same discretionary precedent set by both New York City designated 
Empowerment Zones, the OZ program also produces a much steeper budgetary burden as well. In 
terms of overall costs, the Empowerment Zone Program in New York cost the federal, state and 
local city government $100 million respectively for a total one-time grant of $300 million. 
However, in 2019 the Citizens Budget Commission (CBC) produced a report titled ​Opportunity 
Zones in New York State and City ​which concluded that the the Opportunity Zone program is 
estimated to cost the “​federal government $2 billion annually, with $1.5 billion claimed by 
corporations and $500 million claimed by individuals, for a total cost of $9.4 billion for federal tax 
years 2018 to 2022. This would make it the costliest federal community development tax 
expenditure program, and one-third more expensive than the annual cost of the New Markets Tax 
Credit program, another federal program that allocates tax credits to encourage investment in 
businesses and real estate projects in low-income communities.”  It is important to note that the 39
New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC) Program was specifically enacted to bolster direct funding of 
local CDFIs one of which is the UMEZDC which continues to abide by strict guidelines which 
prioritize the funding of local businesses, real estate projects and community workforce 
development programs within low-income communities. While Empowerment Zones focused 
narrowly on localized community development programs according to Richard Froehlich, “the 
main focus of governmental actors in the case of Opportunity Zones is on inducing overall 
economic activity.” Such laxity in program design fails to impose strict community development 
priorities as enforced by NMTCs and carried out by CDFIs like the Upper Manhattan 
Empowerment Zone Development Corporation.  
 
39Campion, Sean. “Opportunity Zones In New York State and City.” ​Citizens Budget Commission of New York​, 20 Aug. 2019. 
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What is the Most Pressing Planning Concern: The Vast Majority OZ Developments Occur in Wealthy Neighborhoods 
 
Figure 11:  The Ten Most Active OZ-eligible in New York City Total of​ 16,523,667​ square feet of New Construction  
Source: The Real Deal 
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While OZ-eligible developments are located in four of the five boroughs of New York 
City, they constitute only 9% of all active construction citywide (March 2020). Additionally, 
15.5% of all OZ-eligible development sites are located within Empowerment Zone communities in 
Central Harlem and the South Bronx. Most striking though, is the fact that roughly 70-percent of 
all OZ-eligible projects operate within New York Community Districts with median annual 
incomes far above the 2017 citywide average of $62,040 per annum (see table 1 below). With 
Hell’s Kitchen the highest, registering annual median income for neighborhood residents of 
$103,926, roughly 68-percent higher than the citywide average. Jamaica, Queens falls the closest 
to the citywide average with an annual median income of $62,846, roughly 1-percent higher than 
the citywide average. Out of all ten neighborhoods, only three fall below the citywide average 
(Willets Point, Central Harlem and the South Bronx). The neighborhoods with lowest annual 
median incomes represent approximately 30% of all OZ-eligible sites. Accordingly, Willets Point 
ranked the second highest among all neighborhoods with an approximate 15.9% of all eligible 
sites, and Central Harlem as well as the South Bronx falling closer to the bottom at 10.2% and 
5.3% respectively. Therefore, there is a notable discrepancy between the most active OZ-eligible 
neighborhoods when we compare median household income as well as local neighborhood poverty 
rates. South Bronx neighborhoods of Mott Haven and Melrose South exhibit the highest poverty 
rate citywide of 44.2%. They also exhibit a median annual household income of $21,366 per 
annum, roughly 66-percent lower than the citywide average. While it is significantly larger than its 
most distinct counterpart Hell’s Kitchen in terms of geographic size (2.2 sq miles vs. 0.841 sq 
miles), it remains in a state of severe disinvestment even with its Empowerment Zone designation 
accompanied by the new development incentives allocated from the Opportunity Zone initiative. 
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23.4%  23.3% 19.8% $78,069 
Queens CD7 
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15.1% 14.9% 19.8% $94,327 
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10.2% 23.5% 16.2% $49,995 
Queens CD12 
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8.14% 11.3% 12.1% $62,846 
Manhattan CD4 
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7.5% 13.8% 16.2%  $103,926 
*Bronx CD1 
Mott Haven and 
Melrose South 
5.3% 44.2% 28% $21,366 
New York City  **9% 18% N/A $62,040 
* Existing Empowerment Zones 




40All Data From 2017 ACS (American Community Survey) 
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It would seem that the aforementioned claims made by the New York Times that ​“billions 
of untaxed investment profits are beginning to pour into high-end apartment buildings and hotels”, 
is in fact a reality. This is exemplified by OZ-eligible ​NY Census Tract 135, in the Hell’s Kitchen 
portion of Manhattan Community District 4. The poverty rate in ​CD4  was 13.8% in 2017 
compared to 17.9% citywide.  While this area was formally designated as a low-income and 41
low-poverty census tract by the United States Department of the Treasury, it is located on the same 
street (57th Street) as Manhattan’s infamous ‘Billionaire’s Row’. The Max, a new 1,028 market 
rate mixed-use rental building developed by TF Cornerstone was recently completed within this 
tract with rental prices as high as $8,000-plus for a single rental apartment unit. While this 
particular development was financed before the establishment of the Opportunity Zone program it 
sets a precedent for future lucrative market rate developments which will be constructed within the 
OZ boundaries and would qualify for lucrative tax relief. This exemplifies how the decentralized 
nature of the Opportunity Zone program prioritizes quantity over quality, and produces a variety of 
undesirable planning implications such as lack of affordability standards, exclusion of workforce 
development standards as well as the lack of inclusion of local small businesses or trades in the 
policymaking process. While the precedent set by the Empowerment Zone program fostered some 
constraints in terms of its scope and rigid guidelines, its priority for place-based developments and 
inclusion of local small businesses in the planning process allowed for greater neighborhood input 
into what programs could be targeted for direct investment. The Opportunity Zone program does 
not include these same strict guidelines, and as seen in table 1 above permits the majority of its 
benefits to materialize within neighborhoods that are already well off.  
41“Clinton/Chelsea Neighborhood Profile.” ​NYU Furman Center​. 
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While reflecting on the planning implications of OZ-eligible development projects in New 
York City, I am reminded of my interview with former General Counsel to the UMEZDC Lucille 
McEwen, who described the Opportunity Zone program as a policy that “was done to encourage 
investment but it was not as targeted as Empowerment Zones were and it doesn’t have any sort of 
grant opportunities and therefore, does not have the same impact on small business counselling, 
and home-ownership counselling. Basically all of the benefits of Opportunity Zones are focused on 
attracting investors whereas Empowerment Zones were shaped through community based, 
grassroots and non-profit input in each of the communities across the country that were awarded an 
Empowerment Zone.” Thus, major planning implications of current SEZ initiatives in the United 
States include a conspicuous absence of neighborhood input, and as we can see from the current 
pool of development sites the majority of these private developments are taking place outside of 
the census tracts that are in most need of direct investment. While local community input through 
the Empowerment Zone initiative allowed for direct investment in local establishments like the 
Apollo Theater, the Victoria Theater Redevelopment Project, Baldor Specialty Foods, Inc, Dance 
Theater of Harlem, George Washington Bridge Bus Terminal Redevelopment, Studio Museum of 
Harlem and Harlem USA Shopping Complex and workforce development strategies, the current 









6 - Conclusion 
This thesis posited two salient conclusions. While community development strategies of 
the Empowerment Zone program inordinately improved overall employment in Central Harlem 
and the South Bronx, local unemployment fell at a sharper rate than the citywide average. 
Additionally, the current priority of SEZs set by the federal government prioritizes quantity 
rather than quality of local community development and does not institute a precautionary 
principle which promotes a landscape of even urban development. Therefore, through a 
mixed-method analysis this thesis is in agreement with the aforementioned 2007 JAPA (Journal 
of the American Planning Association) which concluded in a similar manner that “workers in 
most Enterprise Zones had longer commutes—even when standardized by mode and 
income—than workers who do not work in zones. The vast majority of workers in Enterprise 
Zones did not live in an Enterprise Zone; moreover, the vast majority of those who lived in these 
zones did not work in them. Thus, the local employment gains derived from bringing jobs to 
poor neighborhoods are greatly diluted— a majority of the jobs will go to non-zone residents.”  42
The same planning implications are true for the recently implemented Opportunity Zone 
initiative which produced a striking imbalance of 70/30, 70-percent of OZ-eligible projects 
occurring in neighborhoods with median incomes above the citywide average compared to just 
30-percent of OZ-eligible projects occurring in neighborhoods below the citywide average. A 
striking pattern shared by both of these initiatives reveals that the majority of employment 
benefits granted to non-Empowerment Zone residents and the majority of tax incentives were 
attributable to more lucrative investments situated in wealthier Opportunity Zone census tracts. 
42Alan Peters & Peter Fisher (2004) The Failures of Economic Development Incentives, Journal of the American Planning 
Association, 70:1, 27-37, DOI: ​10.1080/01944360408976336 
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Placed based initiatives (PBIs) are efficient in terms of overall targeted investment into a 
particular geographic area. However, almost every PBI produces a significant share of negative 
externalities and unwarranted side effects. In the case of SEZs the goal of a PBI on this scale is 
to provide greater investment in goods and services located in underserved urban communities. 
The various drawbacks of these initiatives were clearly outlined by Lucille McEwen who 
recalled that “Harlem was a victim of its own success.” Direct investment into the community 
even by local nonprofits, raised the cost of living and did not substantially increase local 
employment. Even though the initiative was executed from the bottom-up, including local 
community leaders, small business owners and local residents, in the opinion of some local 
community members this experiment in community development produced an irreparable 
outcome for the local community.  
 
Therefore, going forward policymakers must make meaningful efforts to employ a 
precautionary principle that takes into account the uneven impacts that these SEZs contribute 
towards urban development. It is not mere coincidence that a growing number of elected officials 
from both sides of the political aisle are voicing such concerns and following the lead of 
legislators like Senators Cory Booker and Tim Scott, imploring the Treasury Inspector General 
to execute a rigorous audit to identify who is profiting the most from Opportunity Zone 
incentives. Overall, the range of consequences imposed on low-income New Yorkers arising 
from these two specific Special Economic Zone programs appear to categorically favor those 
with means over those who find themselves residing and working in some of the city’s lowest 
income census tracts.  
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This is most evident considering the fact that although two existing Empowerment Zone 
neighborhoods are OZ-eligible due to the presence of some of the lowest median household 
incomes, paradoxically they continue to attract a modest share of private investment compared to 
their wealthier OZ-eligible counterparts. This thesis has provided a variety of evidence that 
suggests that SEZs confer disproportionate economic benefits on wealthier areas of New York 
City compared to their lower-income counterparts. Accordingly, the foundational goal of these 
initiatives to improve local employment and overall investment within these low-income 
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